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Abstract  
 
This study focuses on the the employment and economic wellbeing of single female-headed 
households in the United States in the years 2004, 2007, 2010 and 2013. This has been examined 
from two vantage points: a Heckman Selection Model shows that the reservation wage for the 
nonemployed single female heads is lower than the employed single female heads. This indicates 
a lack of suitable jobs for the nonemployed single female heads. The other mode of investigation 
involves an economic wellbeing analysis of single female heads using the Levy Institute 
Measure of Economic Wellbeing. The LIMEW analysis shows that while the gap in money 
income between the two groups is large, it is rather small in terms of the LIMEW. This is mainly 
because the nonemployed receive much more in transfers from the government, pay less taxes 
and have a higher value for household production. Both employed and nonemployed single 
female heads are net recipients of government benefits.  The bulk of transfers include non 
means-tested benefits such as Social Security and means-tested medical benefits such as 
Medicaid. The employed have some employer contribution to health but the nonemployed have 
no other recourse than depending on the government for medical benefits. Higher care 
responsibilities, lower levels of education and lower reported levels of health status are 
impediments to the nonemployed single female heads from reaping the full benefits of 
employment. This indicates that some women in this group of would benefit from suitable jobs 
with benefits such as adequate childcare provisions and paid leave.  
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INTRODUCTION:	  
 
The purpose of this essay is to investigate the economic wellbeing of single female-headed 
households in the United States. Estimates based on gross (pre-tax) money income show that the 
average single female-headed household is much less well-off than married-couple households 
and single-male headed households. They also suffer from a substantially higher rate of poverty, 
as officially measured. Policies aimed at ameliorating the disadvantage faced by single female-
headed households have focused on tightening or even cutting back on their welfare benefits and 
redesigning benefits to encourage them or leave them with no choice but to enter the labor 
market. Employment is considered the most important stepping stone towards a better life. But 
how valid is this presumption for single female-headed households? 
 
I examine the issue from two distinct vantage points. First, I estimate a labor supply function to 
assess whether employment is likely to yield the same conditional hourly wage for single female-
heads that are currently nonemployed as for single female heads that are currently employed. 
The answer, unfortunately, is in the negative. I discuss my results and their policy implications. 
Second, I compare the economic wellbeing of employed single female-headed households and 
their nonemployed counterparts using gross money income (the most widely used measure of 
economic wellbeing in the U.S.) and the Levy Institute Measure of Economic Wellbeing 
(perhaps the most comprehensive measure of economic wellbeing).The rationale behind this 
exercise is the well-known limitations of money income—limitations that I argue are especially 
crippling in the case of the demographic group that I study. Not surprisingly, the comparison 
based on money income shows the employed to be much better off than the nonemployed. 
However, comparisons based on LIMEW indicates no sizeable difference in wellbeing between 
the two groups. I examine the reasons behind this divergence by means of descriptive analysis 
and using a decomposition methodology. The results of the analysis are discussed with an 
emphasis on their policy implications. 
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The main motivation for looking at the difference that employment makes among single female-
headed households is the welfare reforms during the 1990s that focused on transitioning the 
population dependent on means-tested welfare benefits from welfare to employment. Since 
single female-headed families are the largest group among the officially poor population, they 
were the ones who were most affected by the change in policy. While the poverty rate, as 
officially measured, did fall among single female-headed families, critics pointed out that the 
decline obfuscated the real hardships experienced by single female-headed families because the 
official measure of poverty ignores the unpaid care requirements for families. Specifically, the 
official measure does not take into account the out-of-pocket expenses for care (for children or 
other dependent adults) in its definition of income available to the household or poverty 
thresholds. 
 
I use the LIMEW to assess their wellbeing because MI is particularly inadequate for this group. 
This is because MI ignores household production which includes the time spent on caring for 
children and dependent adults. LIMEW includes an imputed value for this. Hence, a comparison 
of wellbeing between the employed and the nonemployed based on MI would ignore the 
tradeoffs between allocating time between employment and unpaid care activities. MI also 
ignores noncash transfers while LIMEW includes it. This matters because the form of means-
tested welfare has become more in-kind. Being employed means giving up on at least some of 
the means-tested noncash transfers. This tradeoff is not taken into account if the comparison 
between the employed and nonemployed is based on MI. LIMEW includes imputed values for 
in-kind benefits. 
 
The paper shall be arranged as follows. I begin with an overview of the trends in the economic 
wellbeing of single female-headed households. This is followed by a review of the literature. The 
review is broken down into five parts: in the first part, I survey the literature on wellbeing to 
show that there has been a great shift towards wellbeing measures beyond income and per capita 
GDP. The second part is on the importance of household production for wellbeing assessments- 
here we argue why household production is essential to evaluate the economic wellbeing of 
households. The third section describes the concept and empirical methodology of the Levy 
Institute Measure of Economic Wellbeing. The last section of the literature review discusses the 
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views of different schools of thought regarding employment and why promotion of employment 
is a common prescription to alleviate poverty and inequality. The literature review is followed by 
the empirical analysis and a discussion of the policy implications of the findings. The empirical 
section will start with the application of the labor supply function followed by economic 
wellbeing analysis using the LIMEW. The final section is the conclusion.  
ECONOMIC	  WELLBEING	  OF	  SINGLE	  FEMALE-­‐HEADED	  HOUSEHOLDS:	  
TRENDS	  AND	  ISSUES	  	  
 
The most common classification system for families and households in the US groups them into 
three categories based on the marital status and sex of the head (or householder): married couple 
(married head with spouse present), single-male headed (single male head, no spouse present) 
and single female-headed (single female head, no spouse present). Historical data available on 
gross money income and official poverty status show that single female-headed families fare the 
worst among the three types of families. Over the period 1959 to 2015, the median gross money 
income of the average single female-headed family was never below 46 percent and never above 
54 percent of the median gross money income of all families (see Figure 1). 
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Figure 11: Median Gross Money Income of Type of Family as a Percentage of Median 
Gross Money Income of All Families  
 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
In the more recent period from 1990 to 2015, relative median income has fallen within an even 
narrower range of 46 to 51 percent.  The evidence suggests that the disadvantage in money 
income faced by single female-headed households has been fairly large and persistent. On the 
other hand, while the relative median income of single-male headed households has fallen since 
the 1990s, it continued to be much higher than that of single female-headed households. 
According to the latest available data, the relative median income of single female-headed and 
single-male headed families were, respectively, 48 and 70 percent of the median gross money 
income of all families. The problem behind the disadvantage therefore does not stem from the 
status of being single; but being single and female. 
 
Data on official poverty status also indicates a huge gap in the incidence of poverty between the 
single female-headed families and other types of families (see Figure 2). They have a persistently 
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higher poverty rate, as per the official poverty line, compared to married-couple and single-male 
headed families. 
Figure 2: Poverty Status of Families by Type of Family  
Note: Numbers in thousands. Families as of March of the following year  
 
Source: Author’s calculations  
 
If we further categorize single female-headed families by race, we find that according to the most 
recent calculations (2015), 25.8 percent of white single female-headed households are below 
poverty. The rate of poverty is 33.9 percent for black single female heads and 35.5 percent for 
Hispanic single female-heads. This shows that even within single female-headed households, the 
different races have different incidences of poverty.   
 
The fall in poverty in the 1990s, that we can see in Figure 2, might be attributable to the welfare 
reforms that pushed for employment over welfare but it has not been sustainable. This brings the 
merits of employment for single female-headed households into question.  
 
Issues related to the wellbeing of single female heads have been discussed extensively. Margaret 
Nelson shows how single female heads with children face additional disadvantages relative to 
couple households because they have to contribute both the earnings and the unpaid labor that 
are typically contributed by men in a couple household (Nelson 2006). Through the works of 
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Judith Record McKinney (2016), Randi Kjeldstad (2000) and Marit Rønsen (2004) we see the 
vulnerable conditions of single female heads with children, often called “lone mothers” in the 
literature, in different national settings. They show that single female heads face additional 
disadvantages even in non-capitalist economies. In her study, McKinney found that the situation 
of lone mothers seemed to worsen when the Soviet and Russian regimes transitioned to market-
based economies because of the failure of the state to create equal opportunities for women in the 
labor market (McKinney 2016).  
 
A single female head is often the primary breadwinner and the primary caregiver for her family 
(Albelda, Himmelweit and Humphries 2004). Single mothers are at the “sharpest of sharp ends” 
when it comes to the dilemma of balancing work and family life (Albelda, Himmelweit and 
Humphries 2004) because they often have no access to male wages and no other adults to share 
financial and household burdens with. Since they are female, they are also more likely to be 
poorly paid. Then comes the dilemma of time – single female heads with dependents have less 
time than a couple household. This is because they have to juggle between working long hours to 
be able to provide for their family and spending time with their children and other family 
members. If they want to pay for high-quality childcare, that will mean that more money will be 
required to pay for it and thus will translate into longer hours at work. In situations where 
childcare is not affordable or the mother cannot find jobs, they have to rely on the state or the 
community to provide it.  
 
The economic wellbeing of single female-headed households depends on a network of support 
structures that might include men (might include fathers of their children), other immediate 
family members, friends, neighbors, people from the community, the state and so on. Market 
based societies depend on the sexual division of labor and the institutions of marriage and family 
(Albelda, Himmelweit and Humphries 2004). This argument based on the gendered nature of the 
institutional arrangements that underpin the functioning of market economy stand in sharp 
contrast to the arguments made by Garry Becker about the comparative advantages of the sexual 
division of labor. Gary Becker argues that the sex of household members is what differentiates 
who participates in household production and who participates in the market sector. The 
assumption here is that an hour of market time for a woman is not a perfect substitute for an hour 
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of the time for a man when they make the same investments in human capital. If women have a 
comparative advantage over men in the household sector, then an efficient household would 
decide that it is better for women to engage solely in the household sector and that the time of 
men would be better spent in the market. This results in the circular argument of women earning 
less than men because they specialize in home production and they specialize in home 
production because they earn less than men in the labor market. 
 
Historically, women have been discouraged to participate in the labor force after becoming 
mothers and when they have participated, their wages have been lower than that of their male 
counterparts. Women’s wages have been important at improving the standard of living in a 
“dual-earner” household but the same amount is often insufficient on its own. (Albelda, 
Himmelweit and Humphries 2004).  
 
Single female heads with children are exposed to negative social judgment because they are still 
seen as deviant members of the society. However, statistics show that the fact that any mother 
will become a lone mother at some point in her life is high and growing (Albelda, Himmelweit 
and Humphries 2004). Marriages among poor women have declined because of changing social 
dynamics that does not ostracize sex, out-of-wedlock childbirths or cohabiting as much as in the 
past. Research suggests that poor women wait to get married not because they think too little of 
it, but because they hold it in high regard and do not want to make commitments that they cannot 
keep. This happens because they are choosing from a pool of partners, often in a disadvantaged 
neighborhood, and they want to assess the potential risks and rewards of available partnerships 
(Edin and Kefalas 2005). 
 
When the whole social structure seems to be tilted in favor of married parents, heads of single 
female-headed households cannot possibly have a fair chance in the race. Their children grow up 
materially disadvantaged relative to children who grow up in couple households. Most evidence 
point towards the fact that lone mothers are at the bottom of the income distribution and 
according to many feminist economists this phenomenon contributes heavily to the “feminization 
of poverty” (Albelda, Himmelweit and Humphries 2004).  
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Now that I have provided a background to show the disadvantages faced by single female-
headed households, I shall present a review of the relevant literature on the concepts and 
measurements of wellbeing, the importance of household production, the Levy Institute Measure 
of Economic Wellbeing (which will be used in this paper) followed by a discussion on 
employment. This review will facilitate a better understanding of these concepts and explain why 
they are important for this study.   
LITERTATURE	  REVIEW:	  
Concepts	  and	  Measurements	  of	  Wellbeing	  	  
 
Concepts of human wellbeing are important to the study of the economics. Wellbeing 
measurements try to measure “how well is a person’s being?” (Sen 1999). and involves judging 
the quality of a person’s life. Most economists today agree that wellbeing is a multidimensional 
concept and not solely restricted to income measures. The literature surrounding wellbeing 
focuses mostly on three elements - the material, the relational and the subjective dimensions of 
life, prescribing varying degrees of importance to the different components (Sumner and Mallett 
2013). Wellbeing analysis can take both the individual and the community as the unit of analysis. 
 
Traditional measures of economic wellbeing are material or objective in nature – they are 
measured by income or consumption per capita. Material indicators of wellbeing in terms of 
income and consumptions per capita remain useful even though they do not convey the whole 
picture of human wellbeing. For example, when wellbeing assessments are to be made in 
developing countries by means of poverty calculations, the World Bank employs internationally 
comparable poverty lines such as $1.25 or $2 per day for a person. (Chen and Ravallion 2008). 
Anyone making less than the given amount is seen as poor. Measures that only account for 
income or consumption are being challenged by advocates of multidimensional wellbeing. 
Perhaps the most prominent critic of income or consumption based measures has been the Nobel 
laureate Amartya Sen. He has argued that considering only the resources available to a person 
does not convey the real status of a person’s wellbeing2.  
                                                
2 This is because, according to Sen, individuals are different in their ability to transform resources into valuable 
“functionings” (functionings are states of “being and doing” such as having a shelter or being well-fed). Therefore, 
focusing only on means without accounting for what the person can or cannot do with them is insufficient. The 
command over commodities is a “means to the end of well-being, but can scarcely be the end itself” (Sen 1999). As 
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While it must be admitted that creating a measure that encompasses every aspect of the human 
condition is a Herculean task to say the least, attempts to incorporate more dimensions of 
wellbeing have been created by economists.  Most widely discussed among them is the United 
Nations Development Program’s Human Development Index (HDI)3.  
 
The Human Development Index (HDI) is a summary of the average achievement in certain 
perceived key dimensions of human development which are a long and healthy life, being 
knowledgeable and having a decent standard of living. It is a composite index that is created by 
aggregating the three dimensions into a summary measure. Life expectancy at birth is used to 
assess the health dimension; and mean of years of schooling for adults aged 25 years and more 
and expected years of schooling for children of school entering age is used to assess the 
education dimension. Gross national income (GNI) per capita is used to asses the standard of 
living dimension and a logarithm of income is used to reflect the decreasing importance of 
income with increasing GNI. The HDI is generated using country level data. Between 1990 and 
2010, the HDI has undergone several changes in its measurement in terms of education and 
income indicators used, the treatment of income and the aggregation formula. The index is 
closely related to Sen’s idea of wellbeing but critics argue that the HDI is limited because it only 
captures certain key dimensions and its indicators are restricted by data availability. Other 
criticisms include the HDI’s neglect of inequality and the environmental dimensions of 
development. However, the neglect of inequality has been addressed by the introduction of three 
new measures in the 2010 Human Development Report: the Inequality Adjusted HDI4, the 
                                                
highly adaptive beings, we may also learn to not desire that which we cannot achieve but that does not mean that if 
we get access to such resources it will not increase our wellbeing. Sen also argues that both actual achievements 
(functionings) and effective freedom (capability) should be considered in wellbeing evaluations. For instance, the 
nutritional state of a man who is fasting and another who is starving may be the same. It is important that we 
consider the options that people have even if they do not avail them. Sen’s arguments illustrate that wellbeing is no 
easy concept to measure and simplistic measures fail to capture the complexity of the human condition. 
3 The Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative’s (OPHI) Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) is also 
another multidimensional index which has a close relationship with the HDI. The MPI was developed to measure 
deprivations (such as lack of education, lack of employment, poor health and inadequate living standards) along the 
three main axes on which the HDI was constructed.  
 
4 It accounts for inequality in health, education and income and is directly comparable to the HDI and across 
countries.  
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Gender Inequality Index5 and the Multidimensional Poverty Index (Klugman, Rodriguez and 
Choi 2011).  
 
Social cohesion measures are typically used to reflect the relational aspects of wellbeing. They 
try to quantify the extent and quality of personal relationships and social relationships. An 
example of this approach is the work of Jane Jenson. She has employed a classification with five 
dimensions – affiliation/isolation (sharing common values or feeling of belonging to the same 
community), insertion/exclusion (ability to participate in the labor market or the economy), 
participation/ passivity (involvement in the management of public affairs), acceptance/rejection 
(pluralism or tolerance in society) and legitimacy/illegitimacy (how well the various institutions 
which are meant to represent the people and their interests function) (Jenson 1998). Her work 
mainly focuses on Canada but her breakdown of social cohesion into the five dimensions could 
be applicable to other countries as well. A recent comprehensive survey argues that social 
cohesion measures can be strengthened by taking account of the degree of community 
acceptance of minority groups, confidence in national-level institutions and faith in social and 
economic institutions, safety and crime rates in the society that reflect to what extent people feel 
that their freedom of movement and their property are protected, donations to charities and 
voluntary work or help to strangers as ways of showing solidarity with other people. The authors 
of the survey suggest that for social cohesion comparisons to be made across societies, the 
dimensional profiles should be used and not the overall score of social cohesion because 
different communities have very different norms and characteristics. Two different communities 
could have the same social cohesion score based on very different dimensional profiles and thus, 
the overall score might be misleading for policy formulation (Schiefer and van der Noll 2013).  
 
Another family of wellbeing measures is focused on subjective wellbeing and aims to measure 
mental states, including positive and negative evaluations that people make of their lives and the 
affective reactions of people to their own experiences. (OECD 2013). It includes three elements 
which are life evaluation (assessing a person’s life or some aspect of it), affect (a person’s 
                                                
5 It includes educational attainment, economic and political participation and health issues relevant to women. It is 
constructed on the same framework as the HDI and attempts to reflect the differences in achievements between men 
and women.   
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feelings or emotional state of being with reference to a point in time) and eudemonia 
(meaningfulness or purpose in life) (OECD 2013). Subjective wellbeing may be determined by 
personal experience or by wider institutions and cultural norms and values also play a part. An 
interesting study by Stevenson and Wolfers (2013) analyze subjective wellbeing within and 
between countries and find that while it is intuitively plausible that there is some critical level of 
income beyond which income no longer affects wellbeing, there is no evidence of such a 
satiation point.  
 
Several key issues related to the conceptualization and measurement of wellbeing was addressed 
in the landmark report of the Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi Commission (also known as the Sarkozy 
Commission). The report views human wellbeing as a multi-dimensional concept. In addition to 
the capabilities approach of Amartya Sen and the subjective wellbeing approach, the report also 
mentions the “fair allocations” approach as a complementary approach to the measurement of the 
quality of life.6 It argues that objective and subjective dimensions of wellbeing are both 
important. The report proposes that objective factors that shape wellbeing are: (a) material living 
standards (income, consumption and wealth); (b) health; (c) education; (d) time spent on and 
satisfaction from personal activities including paid and unpaid work; (e) political voice and 
governance; (f) social connections and relationships; (g) environmental quality (present and 
future conditions); and (h) economic or physical insecurity (Stiglitz, Sen and Fitoussi 2009). The 
report also makes a distinction between current and future wellbeing. According to the report, 
current wellbeing is concerned with economic resources such as income and non-economic 
variables like what people do, what they can do, how they feel and the natural environment they 
live in. It claims that whether human wellbeing can be sustained over time depends on stocks of 
capital that matter for their lives like natural capital, physical capital, human capital and social 
capital that are passed on to future generations.    
 
The Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi report emphasizes the need to shift from measuring economic 
production to measuring people’s wellbeing. The Commission describes this as a “household 
                                                
6 The fair allocations approach combines the weighted values of different non-monetary dimensions of life with 
commodities to construct augmented allocations for individuals, with the emphasis that the weighted values of non-
monetary dimensions can be derived from individual preferences (Stiglitz et al. 2009: 42). 
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perspective.” The report recommends that household income and consumption should be used as 
one of the indicators of material wellbeing rather than aggregate production because aggregate 
output in an economy can increase even when household income declines or vice versa. These 
discrepancies can occur when we take account of depreciation, income flows into and out of the 
country and discrepancies between the prices of output and the prices of consumer products. The 
Commission also recommends that income measures must be broadened to include nonmarket 
activities.  
 
The household perspective and broadening income measures to include non-market activities is 
crucial to address if measurements of economic activity are to reflect the structural changes that 
occur in a modern economy. Operationalizing the household perspective would involve that 
payment between sectors such as taxes paid to the government, social benefits provided by the 
government including in-kind services such as subsidized health care and educational services, 
and interest payments by households to the financial sector must all be considered in wellbeing 
measurements. Including non-market activities means primarily taking account of household 
production. Stiglitz, Sen and Fitoussi also urge the need for considering income and consumption 
jointly with wealth because while income and consumption provide valuable insight into the 
current living standards of people, they can only provide a complete picture in conjunction with 
information on wealth. This is important because a household that chooses to spend its wealth on 
current consumption increases its current wellbeing at the expense of its future wellbeing. They 
also recommend that wellbeing measures should be designed to address questions of 
distributional equity in terms of the distributions of income, consumption and wealth.  
 
The above discussion suggests that human wellbeing is multidimensional. It is therefore quite 
natural that assessments of wellbeing differ in terms of their focus. We have also found that the 
volume of produced goods and services at the disposal of the individual or nation is crucial to the 
different approaches to wellbeing (e.g., the role of per capita GDP in HDI or household income 
in shaping subjective wellbeing). Assessments of wellbeing would therefore necessarily involve 
considerations of economic well-being or “well-offness” (to use an expression by Amartya Sen). 
Our discussion has also highlighted the role played by considerations of distributional equity in 
evaluations of human wellbeing. The capabilities approach also puts a great deal of emphasis on 
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distributional equity, especially on deprivations. This concern is reflected in the development of 
the MPI7. The OPHI Missing Dimensions of Poverty Data projects in Chad, Nigeria, Chile and 
Philippines which considers quality of work, empowerment, physical safety, ability to go about 
without shame and psychological wellbeing, has added to these attempts recently. Information 
regarding inequalities of wealth, income and consumption should also be integral to wellbeing 
measures according to the Sarkozy Commission. As I discuss later, the Levy Institute Measure of 
Economic Wellbeing (LIMEW), developed several years before the Sarkozy Commission’s 
report, fulfills the major recommendations of the Commission. 
 
The	  importance	  of	  household	  production	  for	  economic	  wellbeing	  
 
In a broad sense, household production consists of goods and services that are produced in the 
household by members of the household without any compensation for their own use. However, 
for the purposes of this study, household production consists of unpaid services produced by 
members of the household for their own use. It includes mainly activities such as caring for 
children, educating the next generation, caring for the elderly and other household 
responsibilities (such as cooking and cleaning). As we argued above, the volume (or real value) 
of the goods and services available to the household is considered to be central to human 
wellbeing in all the major approaches to wellbeing. Given our definition of household 
production, it follows that household production should also be included in a measure of 
economic wellbeing. This was indeed the position taken by the Sarkozy Commission. 
 
While household production constitutes an important aspect of economic activity, it is ignored in 
typical measures of economic growth and welfare. Economists of varying ideological 
persuasions appear to be in agreement regarding the importance of household production. Sen 
(2011) has argued that unpaid care activities are absolutely vital to support sustenance and for 
survival, and it enables workers to get out of the home and work in the market. In a similar vein, 
Gary Becker (1965) writes that “in recent years economists are recognizing that a ’household is 
truly a small factory’ [Cairncross (1958)]: it combines capital goods, raw materials and labour to 
clean, feed, procreate and otherwise produce useful commodities”.  
                                                
7 See footnote 2 
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The second edition of the Canberra Handbook, which was created by an International Expert 
Group on Household Income Statistics known as the “Canberra Group”8,  includes the value of 
household production in the conceptual definition of economic wellbeing but excludes it from 
the operational definition due to measurement issues. The System of National Accounts, which is 
a set of macroeconomic accounts approved by the the Statistical Commission of the United 
Nations and prepared by an Inter-Secretariat Working Group on National Accounts, includes 
paid domestic services but excludes unpaid domestic services (such as laundry, cooking meals, 
caring for adults and children, housekeeping and management, as well as unpaid volunteer work) 
from the production boundary. This is because, according to them, household production has 
limited impact on the rest of the economy because they are produced for immediate consumption 
and cannot be sold or bartered. They also claim that difficulties of identifying market prices to 
value such services serve as a serious limitation, and that changes in household production are 
not affected and do not in turn affect policies because their imputed values are not equivalent to 
monetary flows.  
 
However, we know that there are several reasons which challenge the SNA’s rationale for not 
incorporating household production in economic wellbeing measurements. For example, a 
person may not be able to work in order to take care of their children. This directly affects their 
labor force participation and hence the economy. It is also possible to derive a market price for 
child care since child care services are available in the market. (Canberra Group 2011)  
 
Beyond the Market, a report written by the Panel to Study the Design of Nonmarket Accounts, 
highlights that estimates of the value of household production are necessary to understand the 
trend of economic growth, fluctuations in business cycles and trends in inequality9 (National 
Research Council 2005). The report shows that because household production is inherently non-
market in nature, a value for it must be imputed rather than measured directly. The authors of the 
                                                
8 This was an outcome of the 2008 Conference of European Statisticians review of statistics on income, living 
conditions and poverty. The handbook was written to address the importance of household production and the 
conceptual and measurement problems related to it.  
9 Economic growth can change the relative importance of home and market production and household production 
can also differ across different income groups. 
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report claim that the best valuation method would be to use a quality-adjusted replacement cost 
method. In this method, the specialist wage10 for the household task is multiplied with a number 
that is typically between 0 and 1. This number accounts for the shortfall or excess of the 
household member’s productivity relative to the specialist’s productivity in the given activity. 
The report also recommends including the value of services, materials and energy used to create 
home-produced outputs into accounts describing household production. While output-based 
measures of the value of household production may be theoretically more desirable, most 
existing estimates are based on the valuation of the time spent on household production. 
 
The most widely used method of valuation is described often as the “generalist approach” where 
the average earnings of domestic servants or household employees is used as the replacement 
cost. An alternative measure of the replacement cost is the so-called “specialist approach” where 
the time spent on each category of household production is valued according to the wage of 
worker who is engaged in a similar occupation. (e.g. time spent on plumbing would be valued at 
the hourly wages paid to plumbers). Both generalist and specialist approaches fail to account for 
the differences in the skill and efficiency among household members in performing the tasks of 
household production. The specialist wage will overstate the value of the input if the household 
member is not as skilled as a professional and a generalist approach would lead to an 
underestimation is the member is particularly skilled. There is also the “opportunity cost” or 
“foregone earnings” method where the household member’s time is valued at his or her market 
wage rate. This means that a CEO’s time doing laundry would be valued at his hourly salary. 
This method leads to overestimations due to high imputed prices for fairly low-skilled jobs.  
 
The LIMEW, which is a comprehensive measure of economic wellbeing, includes three broad 
categories of unpaid activities which are classified as household production. These include (i) 
core production activities such as cooking and cleaning; (ii) procurement activities such as 
shopping for groceries; and (iii) care activities such as taking of children or the elderly. It uses 
the replacement cost method with the employee compensation of a private household employee 
multiplied by an index that accounts for three key factors that affect the quality, composition and 
efficiency of household production performed by the individual. The factors are household 
                                                
10 See next paragraph  
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income, educational attainment and time availability. Equal weights are attached to each factor. 
In an ideal situation, the performance index would be able to capture all the factors that may 
influence the performance of household production by individuals. However, given a lack of 
sufficient research findings, the three factors incorporated by the LIMEW represent the next best 
way to reflect the differentials (Wolff, Zacharias and Masterson 2009).  
 
The discussion above highlights the importance of unpaid work for the measurement of 
wellbeing. It also shows that it gets less recognition than it deserves. While there are challenges 
to measuring household production, it can be derived using different valuation methods. The 
LIMEW will be used in this paper because it includes an adequate imputation of household 
production and taking account of household production is particularly relevant for the group I 
study. The LIMEW will help to determine the tradeoff (if any) between employment and unpaid 
household work for single female-headed households. The next section explains the objectives 
and the components of the LIMEW in more detail.  
 
The	  Levy	  Institute	  Measure	  of	  Economic	  Wellbeing	  
 
The LIMEW is based on the view that three key institutions – the market, household and state— 
determine the command of individuals over the necessaries and conveniences of life. Money 
income (MI) is routinely used for poverty and income measurements but it fails to account for all 
these three institutions adequately. Fringe benefits such as employer contributions for health 
insurance and contributions from the state in the form of noncash transfers (e.g. healthcare) and 
direct provisions (such as schooling and highways) are not taken into consideration by MI but 
the LIMEW captures these dimensions. Household production is also left out of MI. I have 
discussed the importance of household production previously and it fits naturally within the 
concept of economic wellbeing that is used in the LIMEW (Wolff and Zacharias 2003).  
 
The LIMEW embodies several of the key recommendations of the Sarkozy Commission 
although it predates the report. The recommendations include taking account of the household 
perspective, addressing questions of distributional equity – overall inequality and group 
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disparities, inclusion of the advantage from wealth11, comprehensive accounting of personal 
taxes, government expenditures for households and the inclusion of household production.  
 
The LIMEW is not the only or the first attempt at constructing a comprehensive measurement of 
economic wellbeing. I provide below a comparison of LIMEW with the income measure 
endorsed by the Canberra Group, drawing heavily on Wolff and Zacharias (2003).  As we can 
see from Table 1, there are three main differences between the LIMEW and the other 
comprehensive income measurement. The first is the treatment of non-housing wealth which 
replaces the measure of property-type income (dividend, interest etc.) with an estimated annuity 
from net worth for non-housing wealth (Wolff and Zacharias 2003). 
 
The second is that public expenditures allocated to households are added and indirect taxes paid 
on personal consumption are subtracted in the LIMEW. The Canberra Group includes some of 
the public expenditures such as education, cultural and recreational services which they classify 
as “social transfers in-kind” and are referred to as noncash government transfers in Table 1. 
However, the LIMEW includes more categories of public expenditures (e.g. a portion of 
highway expenditures is allocated to the household sector and distributed among individual 
households in the LIMEW). When it comes to consumption taxes, the Canberra Group does not 
include it in their measure of disposable income; however, they recommend that consumption 
taxes can be included if the objective is to determine the total redistributive effect of government 
intervention in the form of benefits and taxes on income distribution. The approach taken in the 
LIMEW is consistent with the suggestion made by the Canberra Group because the LIMEW 
intends to measure the total effect of government intervention on economic wellbeing (Wolff and 
Zacharias 2003). 
 
The final difference stems from differences in the treatment of household production. The 
Canberra Group make a distinction between goods and services produced within the household 
for its own consumption. They recommend that only goods be included while services should be 
                                                
11 The Sarkozy Commission highlighted the need for a wealth imputation where a consumption value is derived for 
being able to live in one’s own home as opposed to a rented home. Two people who receive the same money income 
but one lives in his own house while the other person has to pay a monthly rent are not equally well-off ceteris 
paribus. This is incorporated in the LIMEW.  
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omitted because of valuation problems. The LIMEW does not differentiate between goods and 
services and believes that omitting services would almost be equivalent to omitting household 
production altogether because in a modern capitalistic economy, like the United States, most of 
household production consists of services (Wolff and Zacharias 2003).  
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Table 1: Comparing the LIMEW with other extended income measures  
 
Levy Institute   Canberra Group  
Household income   Household income  
Wages and salaries   Wages and salaries  
Fringe benefits (e.g. employer provided 
health insurance)*  
 Fringe benefits*  
Self-employment income   Self-employment income  
Private pensions   Private pensions  
Income from other private welfare funds 
(e.g. private disability income)  
 Income from other private welfare funds  
Interpersonal transfers   Net Interpersonal transfers  
Annuity from (non-home) net worth*   Property-type income (e.g. dividends)  
Rent from owner-occupied housing*   Rent from owner-occupied housing*  
Government cash transfers   Government cash transfers  
Less:   Less:  
Income taxes*   Income taxes*  
Payroll taxes*   Payroll taxes*  
Property taxes on owner-occupied 
housing*  
 Property taxes on owner-occupied housing and 
automobiles*  
Consumption taxes*    
   
Plus:   Plus:  
Government noncash transfers*   Government noncash transfers*  
Public expenditures allocated to 
households*  
  
Household production*   Household production (only goods produced 
for own-consumption and barter)*  
Equals:   Equals:  
Levy Institute Measure of Economic 
Wellbeing  
 C-G Adjusted Disposable Income  
Notes: * indicates values that can only be imputed in income surveys. C-G Adjusted 
Disposable Income refers to one of the income definitions elaborated in Canberra Group 
(2001:18).  
Source: Wolff and Zacharias 2003 
 
 
Now that I have described the concept of the LIMEW and how it compares to other major 
measure of extended income, I shall briefly describe the methodology behind its construction. 
The LIMEW is the sum of the following components (see Table 2): base money income, income 
from wealth, net government expenditures (both cash and non-cash transfers and public 
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consumption, net of taxes), and household production. The following paragraphs will explain 
how each component is calculated.  
 
Base money income is calculated by taking property income (interest, dividends and rents) and 
government cash transfers (such as Social Security benefits) out of MI. This means that the 
major portion of base money income consists of earnings and the remainder consists of pensions, 
interpersonal transfers, worker’s compensation paid by the private sector and other small items 
(Wolff, Zacharias and Masterson 2009).  
 
Then comes an imputed income from the household’s wealth holdings. In the LIMEW, there is a 
distinction made between home wealth and other wealth. Benefits of owner-occupied housing 
(see footnote 10) are accounted for in terms of the replacement cost of the services derived from 
it (i.e., a rental equivalent). This method is consistent with the U.S. national accounts. The 
benefits from non-home wealth is computed using a lifetime annuity method. The annuity is 
calculated based on a given amount of wealth, an interest rate and life expectancy. The annuity is 
assumed to be the same for the remaining life of the householder and the terminal wealth is 
assumed to be zero12.  The LIMEW also accounts for differences in portfolio composition across 
households. This is done by using a weighted average of asset-specific and historic real rates of 
return where the weights are the proportions of the different assets in a household’s total wealth 
(Wolff, Zacharias and Masterson 2009).  
 
The third component is net government expenditures which is the difference between the taxes 
paid and the government expenditures received by the households. Government expenditures 
included in the LIMEW are cash transfers, non-cash transfers and public consumption. These 
expenditures are derived from the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA). For non-cash 
transfers, the LIMEW method distributes the appropriate cost incurred by the government among 
the recipients of the transfer (Wolff, Zacharias and Masterson 2009). 
 
                                                
12 In the case of households with multiple adults, the maximum of the life expectancy of the head of household and 
spouse is used in the annuity formula 
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Unlike most other available measures, public consumption is included in the LIMEW. Certain 
public consumption items, like national defense, that do not increase the household’s access to 
goods or services are excluded from the measurement. Such items generally form part of the 
social overhead and have no market substitutes. Expenditures such as transportation are 
attributed only in part to households because the business sector also avails this provision. 
Estimations are based on the household sector’s usage of such government provisions, for 
example, the household sector’s utilization of highways would be calculated using the miles 
driven on the highways by households. On the other hand, health expenditures are allocated fully 
to households. Education, water and sewerage are distributed on estimated patterns of utilization 
or consumption (like highways mentioned previously). Public health, fire and police are 
distributed equally among the households (Wolff, Zacharias and Masterson 2009). 
 
The other part of net government expenditures is taxes. Only taxes paid directly by the 
households, such as federal and state personal income taxes, property taxes on owner-occupied 
housing, payroll taxes (employee portion) and consumption taxes, are included in the LIMEW. 
Business and corporate taxes are not part of the LIMEW since they are paid directly by the 
business sector. The LIMEW method aligns aggregate taxes (the same method is used for 
government transfers) in the March CPS with their National Income and Product Accounts 
(NIPA) counterparts (Wolff, Zacharias and Masterson 2009).  
 
The fourth component of the LIMEW is household production and its imputation and concept 
was discussed in the previous section.   
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Table 2: Derivation of the LIMEW, 2010 (average values) 
 
 
Derivation	  of	  LIMEW	   Mean	  
Money	  Income	  (MI)	   	  82,115	  	  
Less:	  Property	  income	  	   	  325	  	  
Less:	  Government	  Cash	  Transfers	   	  8,675	  	  
Equals:	  Base	  Income	   	  73,115	  	  
Plus:	  Income	  from	  Wealth	   	  30,757	  	  
Annuity	  from	  non-­‐home	  wealth	   	  22,228	  	  
Imputed	  rent	  on	  owner-­‐occupied	  housing	   	  8,529	  	  
Less:	  Taxes	   	  22,474	  	  
Federal	  Income	  Taxes	   	  11,475	  	  
State	  Income	  Taxes	   	  2,802	  	  
Property	  Taxes	   	  1,525	  	  
Payroll	  taxes	   	  4,964	  	  
Consumption	  Taxes	   	  1,708	  	  
Plus:	  Transfers	   	  18,251	  	  
Equals:	  Comprehensive	  Disposable	  Income	  (CDI)	   	  99,649	  	  
Plus:	  Public	  Consumption	   	  20,173	  	  
Equals:	  Post	  Fiscal	  Income	   	  119,822	  	  
Plus:	  Household	  Production	   	  33,986	  	  
Plus:	  Employer	  Contribution	  to	  Health	   	  4,399	  	  
Equals:	  LIMEW	   	  158,207	  	  
Source: Authors’ calculation based on the LIMEW microdata file.  
 
 
Table 2 shows the derivation of the LIMEW and the mean values of all its components for all 
households in the United States in 2010.13 From the table we can see the disparity between the 
LIMEW (158,207 USD) and MI (82,115 USD) and all the factors of economic wellbeing that MI 
fails to capture.  
 
                                                
13 See Wolff, Zacharias and Masterson (2012) for details regarding the construction of LIMEW 
files. Although the methodology for years after 2007 is not described there, the sources and 
methods are the same for the later years analyzed here too,  
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Employment	  	  
 
Since this paper explores the differences in economic wellbeing between employed and 
nonemployed single female-headed households, before going into the empirical analysis, I 
discuss how the reform of means-tested transfers have focused on encouraging employment 
among working-age adults. The arguments between proponents of differing ideological 
persuasions have generally been based on the premise of employment being good and most 
forms of government assistance (e.g. cash payments under the Temporary Assistance for Needy 
Families program) being bad for the wellbeing of working-age adults and their families. 
However, for the single female heads who do not have the benefits of partnership like a married 
couple household, there are costs to paid work. These costs include, amongst others, arranging 
for childcare or having to take care of household chores after work and this has not been taken 
seriously when it comes to policy formulation that aims to ameliorate their livelihood.  
 
When we explore the literature, we find that Blank and Blinder (1986) have showed that many 
households, especially those headed by women and nonwhites have not been able to benefit from 
economic growth as much as other types of households (Albelda 1999). The expansion in the 
1990s resulted in large reductions in welfare and poverty rates for single female heads did go 
down, but they still have the highest incidence of poverty when compared to married couple or 
single male-headed families.  
 
Welfare reform swept the US in the 1990s under the Clinton administration, culminating in the 
repeal of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) in the Federal Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996. This act allowed states to 
define who is “needy” and established the creation of block grants with time limits. In a nutshell, 
“welfare to work” has come to define welfare reform. These policies intended to promote 
marriage and employment as a substitute for welfare. Old Age, Survivors, and Disability 
Insurance (OASDI), Unemployment Insurance (UI), and the former Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children (AFDC) share their origins in the 1935 Social Security Act which was also 
based upon the preservation of a “traditional” family comprised of a male breadwinner who is 
married to a woman who performs all the necessary unpaid work at home. 
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From the AFDC’s work requirements14 (Page and Larner 1997), it can be seen that by the late 
1960s, employment was seen as an important way to get women, especially black women, off 
welfare rolls. Since the 1990s, this changed even more as paid work became the main alternative 
due to the time-limited benefits. It was no longer a right to receive an income for taking care of 
your children.  
 
Public policy insistence of getting single mothers to work means that a substantial share of these 
women often get a job in the low wage labor market. In the US, jobs in this sector typically have 
minimal flexibility and few “family-friendly” benefits (Albelda, Himmelweit and Humphries 
2004). Welfare reform with employment conditions end up creating “work/family binds” in 
single female-headed households. I elaborate on this in the LIMEW analysis where we see that 
being engaged in paid work does not reduce household responsibilities for single female heads 
and this ends up being a “second shift” for them. This bind to juggle work and family results in 
uneven employment and volatile earnings for single female-headed households. It also means 
that these women have to leave children with relatives or foster care and that many such single 
female heads may have to settle for living arrangements that may not be the best for them or for 
their families (Albelda 2001). During the 1960s and 1970s feminist literature referred to the 
work/family bind as the “double day” and this was applicable mostly to white and colored 
working class women who needed to work to support their families. It is true that working 
mothers were more common in the 20th century than in the 1950s, but mothers in the United 
States have always held jobs or been engaged in income generating activities. There was only a 
short period of time after the WWII when men earned a family wage which was sufficient and 
their wives did not have to work. This was largely possible because of the unionization of the 
1930s and the 1940s (Albelda 1999). When it comes to black women, Moynihan (1965) argued 
that the lack of opportunity for black men resulted in the need for black women to enter the labor 
force.  
 
Women who move from welfare to employment often find themselves back on welfare because 
they usually participate in the low wage market and it is hard for them to be the sole breadwinner 
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of the family without public assistance or a kinship network. Blank (1995) and Smith (1984) 
both discuss that poor mothers take jobs that do not help to sustain families and if employment-
bound welfare reforms continue it is not likely to improve. Spalter-Roth et al. (1995) and Harris 
(1993) used longitudinal data to document patterns of earnings and public assistance use of 
single mothers. They show that some women cycle between welfare and paid employment while 
others combine the two (Albelda 1999). Edin and Lein (1997) also show in their research that 
low income mothers with little or no male support slip in and out of employment and welfare. 
They also highlight that women with extensive labor force experiences still struggle to take care 
of their families and their low wages are not sufficient to pay regular bills. The jobs women find 
often do not allow them ample flexibility that is required to deal with the demands of families 
with children. Meyer and Cancian (1998) found that five years after women left receiving 
welfare, as many as 41 percent of them still remained in poverty.  
 
Much of the previous work done in the 1960s and the 1970s is about the working poor and while 
it is useful, it does not cover the entire scope of the reality that encompasses single female heads 
with children because if they are employed, they are not only workers but also the primary 
caretakers of their children. This is why it is questionable if earnings can be substituted for 
public assistance for single female heads with significant care responsibilities.  
 
Policies targeted at poor lone women in the United States were not guided by the needs of the 
women in this group but rather by judgments about them based upon which it was decided if 
they are worthy of public assistance or not. Welfare is no longer assumed to be an entitlement 
and the overall message for single female heads is that welfare is bad while marriage and 
employment are good. The most generous cash transfer programs in the United States are Social 
Security and unemployment insurance which are employment based. This means that those who 
had long spells of not being employed or earned low wages when they were employed and are 
not attached to someone with a better employment record, may receive very little or no support 
at all.  
 
Households headed by women ceased to be an anomaly by the 1970’s but policies have failed to 
catch up (Albelda 1999). The social welfare policies are still built on a model where there is one 
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breadwinner and one caretaker and it is assumed that these are not the same people. The 
breadwinner secures health benefits, pensions, Social Security, and unemployment insurance 
through continuous employment and ensures financial security for the household while the 
caretaker takes care of the household responsibilities. This model has been breaking down for all 
families and is specifically irrelevant when it comes to single female-headed households (Albeda 
1999).  
 
Much of the literature on welfare reform and welfare reform itself places a great deal of 
emphasis on employment often at the neglect of the impact on families. Success of policies is 
largely judged by looking at the reduction in the number of caseloads and the employment 
statistics among those who leave welfare. Child care is often seen as important but mostly as an 
ancillary support for women moving from welfare into employment. While employment remains 
one of the keys ways to improve the economic wellbeing of single female-headed households, 
looking solely at whether a single female head has a job or not is not enough to understand the 
complex structure of their lives. This will be made clearer in the next section that empirically 
analyzes and discusses the employment and economic wellbeing of single female-headed 
households.  
EMPLOYMENT	  AND	  ECONOMIC	  WELLBEING:	  EMPIRICAL	  ANALYSIS	  	  
 
As we saw above, employment often imposes hardships on single female-headed households. 
But, it is also one of the key ways to gain access to resources in a capitalist economy. This raises 
the question regarding barriers encountered by single female heads in seeking employment. It 
also leads to questions about how much does current economic wellbeing differs between 
households with employed and nonemployed heads. Is obtaining whatever job that one can 
reasonably find a “one-size-fits-all” type of solution for single female heads? Are policies that 
target employment alone informed by an inadequate understanding of their lives?  
 
We try to address these questions by first exploring the differences between the characteristics of 
the two groups in terms of their age or educational distribution, the number of people or children 
in their households and so on. Investigating the differences in their characteristics will help shed 
light on why one group is employed and the other is not. Then, we estimate the reservation wage 
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for the nonemployed group of single female heads to assess if insufficient wage could be a 
barrier for their employment.  
 
We also want to understand how the economic wellbeing of the employed and the nonemployed 
single female-headed households are different in terms of their money income, the taxes the two 
groups are paying, the transfers they are receiving, their wealth, public consumption and 
household production. For this we shall turn to the LIMEW to assess the economic wellbeing of 
the two groups. Then, an Oaxaca Blinder decomposition (explained in the section on LIMEW 
analysis) will be done to assess the wellbeing gap between employed and the nonemployed 
single female-headed households to see the impact of college education, race, age and number of 
children in the household on overall wellbeing.  
 
In our research we attempt to contribute to the existing literature by using the LIMEW to analyze 
the impact of employment on single female-headed households. We are using the LIMEW 
because we believe it is the most comprehensive measure of economic wellbeing. It is the best 
available measure for our research since it gives us insights into how economic wellbeing is 
affected by household production, public consumption, taxes, noncash transfers and wealth of 
single female-headed households.  The LIMEW has not been previously used before for such an 
analysis and we aim to contribute this perspective through our research.   
	  
Employment	  and	  Earnings	  of	  Single	  Female	  Heads	  
 
When households are categorized based on type of family (married head with spouse present, 
single male head and single female head), the classification is broad enough for ample diversity 
to exist within a group. We assume single female-headed households are also a diverse group. To 
confirm our assumption, we dig deeper into the characteristics of the households within our 
group of interest.  This will also help us understand the differences between the employed and 
the nonemployed households and to understand why one group is working and the other is not. 
We focus henceforth on heads between the ages of 25 and 64. Our source of data is the 2011 
Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) of the Current Population Survey conducted 
 32 
by the U.S. Bureau of Census (March CPS)15. We consider the head as employed if the person 
was employed during 2010 and as nonemployed otherwise. 
 
Table 3: Marital Status of Single Female Heads  
MARITAL	  STATUS	   EMPLOYED	  %	   NONEMPLOYED	  %	  
married,	  spouse	  
absent	   3.68	   6.89	  
separated	  	  	   8.38	   11.68	  
divorced	  	  	   37.36	   27.31	  
widowed	  	  	   7.4	   10.07	  
never	  married/single	  	  	   43.18	   44.06	  
Source: Author’s calculations  
 
First we check the marital status of the two groups (Table 3). We see that the two groups are 
roughly similar in terms of the share of heads that were never married. The nonemployed group 
has a larger share of widowed, separated and married with spouse absent female heads in the 
nonemployed group. There are more divorced female heads in the employed group than in the 
nonemployed group.  
 
Table 4: Age Distribution of Single Female Heads  
AGE	  GROUP	   25-­‐34	   35-­‐44	   45-­‐54	   55-­‐64	  
EMPLOYED	  	   28%	   24%	   27%	   21%	  
NONEMPLOYED	  	   33%	   27%	   24%	   17%	  
Source: Author’s calculations  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
15 The characteristics of individuals such as age etc. are as of the time of the survey; income questions are for the 
previous year. 
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Figure 3: Age Distribution of Employed and Nonemployed Single female heads  
 
Source: Author’s calculations  
 
When we check the age distribution of the two groups (Table 4, Figure 3), we see that there is a 
greater percentage of employed women in the 45 to 64 group. More nonemployed single female 
heads in the 25 to 44 group.  
 
Table 5: Educational Status of Single Female Heads  
EMPLOYMENT	  STATUS	  
LESS	  THAN	  
HIGH	  
SCHOOL	  	  
HIGH	  
SCHOOL	  	  
SOME	  
COLLEGE	  	  
COLLEGE	  
OR	  MORE	  
EMPLOYED	  	   7%	   24%	   34%	   34%	  
NONEMPLOYED	  	   27%	   34%	   26%	   13%	  
Source: Author’s calculations  
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Figure 4: Educational Status of Employed and Nonemployed Single female heads  
 
Source: Author’s calculations  
 
When we look at the education status of the employed and the nonemployed single female heads 
(Table 5, Figure 4), we see that there is a higher percentage of nonemployed female heads that 
have less than a high school diploma or only a high school diploma (7 percent of employed 
single female heads and 27 percent for nonemployed single female heads have less than a high 
school diploma and 24 percent of employed single female heads and 34 percent of nonemployed 
single female heads have only a high school diploma). The employed group has spent more years 
in formal education, which is obvious from the numbers in the table above. More employed 
single female heads have some college education, have completed college or have more 
advanced degrees. A higher education is likely to have given these women access to more and 
better jobs relative to the women in the nonemployed group. 
 
Table 6: Racial Composition of Single Female Heads  
RACE	   EMPLOYED	  %	  
NONEMPLOYED	  
%	  
WHITE	  	   68	   56	  
NONWHITE	  	   32	   44	  
Source: Author’s calculations  
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Figure 5: Racial Composition of Employed and Nonemployed Single female heads  
 
Source: Author’s calculations  
 
Since race has historically played a role in employment trends in the United States, we check to 
see the racial composition of the two groups (Table 6, Figure 5). We find that there is a higher 
percentage of women who report being white (i.e., non-Hispanic white) in the employed group 
(68 percent) as opposed to the nonemployed group (56 percent).  
 
Next we investigate the similarities or differences in the household size and composition of the 
two groups. In terms of household size, nearly 40 percent of households in both groups had only 
a single member, the head (Figure 6). The average size of employed and nonemployed 
households was, respectively 2.17 and 2.38. Turning to household composition, I found that a 
little over 60 percent of households in both groups had no children, defined as persons under the 
age of 18 (Figure 7). However, as shown in Figure 8, the presence of young children (persons 
under 6 years of age) was higher among the nonemployed than the employed households (19 
versus 15 percent). The difference between the two groups is more noticeable when we consider 
the differences in the average number of children (0.63 for employed single female headed 
households and 0.80 for nonemployed single female headed households).  
 
The greater average number of young children (0.17 for employed single female headed 
households and 0.29 for nonemployed single female headed households) and all children  may be 
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indicative of the higher care responsibilities shouldered by the heads in nonemployed 
households.16 Jane Waldfogel (1997, 1998) measured the wage gap between mothers and other 
women to see the degree to which family responsibilities lower a woman’s earnings. She found 
that even after controlling for education, work experience and hours of work, women with 
children make less than other women. Waldfogel called it the “pay penalty”. She related it to 
lone mothers and argued that lone mothers are subject to a larger pay penalty than other women 
with children and this explained their high rates of poverty. Our study focuses on single female 
headed households and groups them into employed and nonemployed heads and we find that the 
nonemployed heads have higher child care responsibilities. This could be a very likely 
explanation for why these women are not working (graphs below).  
 
A national survey of employees and their use of family and medical leave found that more than 
20 percent of women who did not receive paid leave turned to welfare when they had a child 
(Albelda and Manuel 2000). The reforms that push for employment have led to more and more 
free or low-cost childcare providers joining the labor market. Childcare subsidies are often 
limited to one year after leaving welfare and finding childcare providers who are willing to take 
childcare subsidies has also become more difficult. This is compelling families to depend on 
younger care-givers who are often siblings or having no other option but to leave children 
unattended or take them to work. In many cases it also means that the single female head must 
remain nonemployed in order to take care of her young children. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
16 Apart from the presence of children, care responsibilities can also be affected by whether the children have any 
special needs (e.g. disability or sickness) and the presence of adults who need care. Unfortunately, there is not 
enough information in the survey regarding these aspects. 
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Figure 6: Number of people in the household of Employed and Nonemployed Single female 
heads in  
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations  
 
Figure 7: Number of kids in the household of Employed and Nonemployed Single female 
heads  
 
Source: Author’s calculations  
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Figure 8: Number of young kids in the household of Employed and Nonemployed Single 
female heads  
 
Source: Author’s calculations  
 
From the discussion above, we can confirm our assumption that single female heads are indeed a 
diverse group of women with women from different marital status, age groups, races, educational 
status and so on. We also found that, in general, the nonemployed heads are less likely to be 
divorced, older, college-educated and white; they are also likely to shoulder greater 
responsibilities of household production. 
 
Now we attempt to find the reservation wage for the nonemployed single female heads. I want to 
see if the nonemployed single female heads are not working because they have a higher 
reservation wage than the market wage. If that is the case, their nonparticipation can be 
explained by the unattractive pay they can hope to receive. As is well-known, standard OLS 
methods will fail in estimating the reservation wage because hours and wages are not observed 
for this group. If we group the nonemployed and employed persons together in an OLS 
regression with the wage as the dependent variable, the resulting parameter estimates will be 
biased. Neither can we reasonably infer the wage of the nonemployed by predicting their wage 
using the OLS equation estimated for the employed alone. This is due to the fact that when we 
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regress wages on the characteristics of those who are in employment, we are not observing the 
equation for the population as a whole. Those in employment will tend to have higher wages 
than those who are not and hence results will be biased. This is known as sample selection bias. 
We use Heckman’s Sample Selection Model because it overcomes the problem of sample 
selection bias.17  
 
Table 7: Reason for Not Working Last Year for Employed and Nonemployed Single 
Female Heads 
Reason	  for	  not	  working	  last	  year	  	   Nonemployed	  Single	  female	  heads	   Nonemployed	  men	  	  	  
Could	  not	  find	  work	  	   12	   18	  
Ill/	  disabled18	  	   40	   41	  
Taking	  care	  of	  home/	  family	  	   22	   4	  
Going	  to	  School	   11	   10	  
Retired	  	   13	   24	  
Other	  	   2	   3	  
Total	  	   100	   100	  
Source: Author’s calculations  
 
Before applying our model, we check to see why the nonemployed single female heads did not 
work in the previous year, i.e., 2010 (Table 7). We see that 40 percent report being ill or 
disabled, 22 percent report having to take care of their homes or families and 11 percent are 
going to school. When we compare this to the reasons reported by nonemployed men (between 
age 25 and 64), we see that only 4 percent report having to take care of their homes or families. 
These figures reinforce, if not confirm, the gendered responsibilities for care.  
 
 
 
 
                                                
17 The model that I use is similar to the models described in Bishop et al (2009) and Blau and Kahn (2007)     
18 We also see that a high proportion of these women report being ill/disabled. This group is left out of our model 
because no matter how buoyant the conditions of the labor market, they will not be able to work since they have a 
disability. They are also kept out of the descriptive statistics and the LIMEW analysis to keep our sample of interest 
consistent, but a high proportion of ill/disabled nonemployed single female heads has some serious implications 
when it comes to the medical benefits they receive from the government. This shall be discussed later in the LIMEW 
analysis. 
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Sample	  Preparation	  
 
To create the sample for estimating the reservation wage, we exclude women who are ill or 
disabled, going to school, retired and in the armed forces (using the WHYNWLY variable from 
ASEC). We define those as employed who report having one or more weeks of work during the 
preceding calendar year (using the variable WKSWORK2 from ASEC).   
 
The dependent variable is hourly wage. It was generated by dividing total annual income from 
earnings (adding income from wages, income from business and farm income) by total annual 
hours worked (usual hours worked last year multiplied by weeks worked last year). 
 
Dependent variables used in the estimation are education, race, age, age squared, regional 
variables, metropolitan, number of kids, the presence of children under the age of 6, asset income 
of the single female head (income from dividends, rent and interest), total household income 
excluding the single female head’s income and number of people in the household minus the 
head.   
 
Estimation	  method	  
 
The Heckman selection model is a two equation model. First, there is the regression model:  
 𝑦 = 𝑣𝛽 + 𝑢' 
And second, there is the selection model: 𝑧𝛾 + 𝑢* > 0 
where the following holds,  𝑢~𝑁(0, 𝜎) 𝑢~𝑁(0,1) 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟	   𝑢', 𝑢* = 𝜌 
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Results	  	  
 
Table 8: Results from Heckman Selection Model for Single Female Heads  
 
hourly wage Coefficients   
Std. 
Error  
z 
value  P>z 95% Conf.  Int 
       
wage equation       
less than high school  -6.044 3.044 -1.990 0.047 -12.009 -0.078 
high school  -11.307 1.445 -7.820 0.000 -14.139 -8.474 
some college  -9.500 1.022 -9.300 0.000 -11.502 -7.497 
age 1.321 0.280 4.710 0.000 0.772 1.871 
age squared -0.013 0.003 -4.170 0.000 -0.020 -0.007 
nonwhite  -2.299 0.836 -2.750 0.006 -3.937 -0.660 
new england  -4.491 1.554 -2.890 0.004 -7.537 -1.444 
mid atlantic  -2.341 1.565 -1.500 0.135 -5.409 0.727 
east north central  -5.382 1.475 -3.650 0.000 -8.273 -2.492 
west north central  -6.702 1.552 -4.320 0.000 -9.744 -3.660 
south atlantic -3.128 1.291 -2.420 0.015 -5.659 -0.598 
east south central -6.837 1.877 -3.640 0.000 -10.516 -3.159 
west south central -5.509 1.691 -3.260 0.001 -8.823 -2.195 
mountain division  -4.426 1.648 -2.680 0.007 -7.656 -1.195 
pacific division  0.000 (omitted)     
not in metropolitan  -4.374 0.976 -4.480 0.000 -6.287 -2.460 
constant  3.585 6.044 0.590 0.553 -8.261 15.431 
       
select equation       
number of kids  -0.065 0.030 -2.150 0.031 -0.124 -0.006 
dummy for young kids  -0.204 0.054 -3.760 0.000 -0.310 -0.097 
asset income  0.000 0.000 -1.450 0.146 0.000 0.000 
household total income 
minus head's income  0.000 0.000 -0.090 0.928 0.000 0.000 
number of people in 
household minus head -0.049 0.025 -1.960 0.050 -0.098 0.000 
less than high school  -1.051 0.067 
-
15.580 0.000 -1.183 -0.918 
high school  -0.580 0.051 
-
11.270 0.000 -0.681 -0.479 
some college  -0.313 0.051 -6.130 0.000 -0.413 -0.213 
age 0.005 0.014 0.340 0.732 -0.023 0.033 
age squared  0.000 0.000 -0.330 0.742 0.000 0.000 
nonwhite -0.096 0.038 -2.500 0.012 -0.171 -0.021 
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new england  0.074 0.077 0.960 0.335 -0.076 0.224 
mid atlantic -0.043 0.074 -0.580 0.559 -0.188 0.102 
east north central  0.029 0.070 0.410 0.682 -0.109 0.166 
west north central 0.304 0.079 3.840 0.000 0.149 0.459 
south atlantic 0.014 0.062 0.230 0.819 -0.107 0.135 
east south central  0.018 0.087 0.210 0.833 -0.152 0.188 
west south central  0.094 0.081 1.150 0.248 -0.066 0.254 
mountain division  0.079 0.081 0.980 0.328 -0.079 0.238 
pacific division  0.000 (omitted)     
not in metropolitan  0.028 0.047 0.600 0.550 -0.064 0.121 
constant  1.764 0.306 5.760 0.000 1.164 2.365 
       
mills       
lambda -9.477 6.819 -1.390 0.165 -22.842 3.889 
       
rho -0.264      
sigma 35.845      
Source: Author’s calculations  
 
predicted	  wage	  	   Observations	  	   Mean	   Standard	  Deviation	  	   Minimum	  	   Maximum	  	  
for	  nonemployed	  
single	  female	  
heads	   996	   17.38	   6.33	   0.87	   35.73	  
Source: Author’s calculations  
 
The identification in the wage equation is made possible by the exclusion of children variables 
such as number of kids and the dummy for young kids in this equation. From the wage equation 
we find that the wages of single female heads reflect a premium for college degrees relative to 
other levels of educational attainment. Surprisingly, the results indicate that the penalty for 
having a high school diploma or some college education is larger than having less than high 
school education. Age seems to have a positive effect on wages while being nonwhite and not 
living outside a metropolitan area carried a wage penalty. The selection equation shows the 
negative impact of children (both kids and young kids) on single female heads being selected 
into the equation. Asset income seems to be negligible for this group.   
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We find that the average reservation wage for nonemployed single female heads is 
approximately 17.38 dollars per hour. The parameter estimates from the selection equation 
suggests that the number of kids and the number of young kids negatively affect the selection 
into the labor market. It is notable that the reservation wage is 16% lower than the average wage 
of employed single female heads in 2010 (the employed have an hourly wage of approximately 
20.63 dollars per hour). This suggests that, on the average, the reason for nonemployment is not 
the expectation of a higher hourly wage than the wage that can be earned under the current labor 
market conditions.  
 
A number of circumstances may help explain why employable people remain nonemployed in 
spite of being willing to accept a wage that is lower than the wage earned by those similar to 
them. First, there may be an overall shortage of jobs related to deficient aggregate demand. This 
was indeed true in 2010 as it was the year with the highest unemployment rate (9.6 percent) since 
the Great Recession.19 In addition, specific disadvantages faced by the group of single female 
heads excluded from employment also could be at work, i.e., they are proportionately more 
nonwhite and less college-educated. It has been widely documented that minorities and those 
without a college education was hit especially hard during the Great Recession (e.g., Hout and 
Cumberworth 2012). 
 
We should also consider that for some of the nonemployed individuals entering employment 
may mean losses in government benefits. This is the well-known phenomenon of “poverty-trap.” 
Housing and medical benefits are quite important in this context (e.g. Danziger et al.2002). For 
example, lack of availability of adequate medical benefits is often a defining feature of low-wage 
employment. For those who need medical care for themselves or their dependents, the prospect 
of losing government medical benefits act as a barrier to employment. Similar considerations 
also apply to housing. 
 
We already discussed the negative influence of the variables in our model (number of children 
and presence of young children in the household) reflecting care responsibilities on the 
                                                
19 The unemployment rate reported here is the standard definition used by the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics: annual average of seasonally unadjusted monthly rates (Series LNU04000000). 
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probability of being employed. However, it should be noted that these variables cannot capture 
the whole picture regarding care responsibilities in many instances (e.g. presence of adults or 
children requiring care).  Since our source of data (ASEC) does not contain the requisite 
information, we were unable to specify our model adequately to capture the multiple constraints 
that caring responsibilities impose on women’s employment prospects.  
 
There are also potentially other unobserved characteristics of the individual that prevents her 
from acquiring a suitable (i.e., suitable on the basis of observed characteristics) and available job. 
Lack of adequate transportation and the resulting spatial mismatch between job seekers and jobs 
has often been cited as an important barrier for low-income women (e.g. Blumenberg 2004). 
 
LIMEW	  Analysis	  	  
 
We have shown that some single female heads were not employed even though their reservation 
wage was lower than the market wage earned by similar employed individuals in 2010. In 
discussing the implications of this finding, we highlighted several barriers to women’s 
employment. Some of the barriers in question relate to factors that are not reflected in the money 
income of individuals and households (e.g. government noncash transfers and household 
production).  This raises the following question:  how does the economic wellbeing of the 
nonemployed single female heads compare to that of the employed heads? To answer this 
question, I turn to the LIMEW because money income will not convey the difference between 
the two groups.  
 
In conducting this exercise, I look at four years – 2004, 2007, 2010 and 2013 for identifying 
recent trends, but concentrate only on 2010 when investigating deeper trends and characteristics 
of the employed and nonemployed groups.20 Households headed by elderly (65 years or older) 
single females are excluded from this study because they would distort the comparisons based on 
employment status. The vast majority of elderly single female heads are nonemployed, although 
the employment rate among them has increased slightly between 2004 and 2007 from 12 to 14 
                                                
20 The patterns are approximately the same for all the years studied here and hence focusing on a 
single year may not compromise my findings. The reason for choosing 2010 rather than 2013 is 
that the latter year had a smaller sample size due to changes in ASEC survey methods. 
 45 
percent. Including them in the analysis would drastically alter the composition of the 
nonemployed group and render the interpretation of the findings harder. Single female heads 
below 25 years of age, and those who report being ill/disabled, in school or retired are also 
excluded from the analysis to keep the LIMEW analysis consistent with the Heckman Selection 
Model.  
 
 
 
Table 9: Trends in economic wellbeing of single female-headed households by measure, 
2004 to 2013 (2013 dollars) 
 
  Employed  Nonemployed 
  2004 2007 2010 2013 2004 2007 2010 2013 
Average 
values 
  
MI 56,504 58,691 56,904 56,244 18,309 19,436 20,123 22,339 
LIMEW 85,691 88,306 89,445 88,249 85,050 84,855 86,038 90,342 
Equivalent 
MI 89,586 92,605 84,146 87,971 22,683 23,885 23,166 25,628 
Equivalent 
LIMEW 125,259 128,327 120,117 125,928 85,050 99,993 94,508 101,753 
Median 
values  
MI 44,397 46,066 43,710 44,221 8,879 9,438 11,267 11,039 
LIMEW 71,601 73,101 75,400 74,373 74,111 77,120 74,365 81,899 
Equivalent 
MI 70,365 72,572 64,302 67,206 10,851 12,000 12,821 13,552 
Equivalent 
LIMEW 108,227 109,482 103,929 107,743 92,461 95,601 85,882 95,097 
Source: Author’s calculations  
 
 
To understand the difference between using LIMEW and money income (MI) as a measure of 
economic wellbeing, we first compare the mean and median values of the LIMEW and money 
income for single female-headed households who are employed (Table 9). The picture of 
economic wellbeing is substantially different in the two measures. First, the average and median 
values of LIMEW are higher than their MI counterparts in all four years. This should not be 
surprising because LIMEW includes components of wellbeing (e.g. value of noncash 
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government transfers) that are not included in MI. However, the size of the difference is quite 
noteworthy. For example, the median MI for the employed was only 58 percent of median 
LIMEW in 2010. Second, the year-to-year changes in the two measures can be in opposite 
directions. Once again, the median values of LIMEW and MI for the employed can illustrate this 
aspect. Median MI fell while median LIMEW rose between 2007 and 2010 for the employed 
single female heads. On the other hand, median MI rose and median LIMEW fell between 2010 
and 2013 for the employed heads. In light of our earlier discussion of the two measures, such 
differences are not unlikely. Year-to-year change in MI primarily reflects change in money 
earnings. The change in LIMEW is more complex and reflects the balance of the sometimes 
opposing movements in its different components. Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly for my 
purposes here, is how the measured disparity between the two groups is strikingly different 
between the MI and LIMEW measures.  
 
Figure 9: LIMEW and Money Income Ratios of Single Female Headed Households in 2010 
 
Source: Author’s calculations  
 
The difference between the two groups in the LIMEW is much smaller than the difference in MI. 
While this finding can be seen in Table 9, it can be observed more readily if we consider the ratio 
of the level of well-being of the employed to that of the nonemployed. The ratios calculated from 
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Table 9 are shown in Figure 9. While the average LIMEW of the employed single female-headed 
households is only 4% higher than the nonemployed single female-headed households in 2010, 
the average money income is 183% higher for the employed group than the nonemployed group. 
Similar patterns can be observed for the mean values of LIMEW and MI for the other years as 
well. Turning to the median values, we see that, in 2010, the median MI for the employed single 
female heads is 288% higher than median MI for the nonemployed single female heads while the 
median LIMEW is only 1% higher. Comparing the two measures after adjusting for differences 
in household size and composition by means of an equivalence scale does not alter the basic 
finding. For example, the mean value of the equivalence scale adjusted MI for the employed is 
263% higher for the employed single female heads while the equivalence adjusted LIMEW is 
only 27% higher. The much smaller disparity in LIMEW is robust since the trend remains the 
same whether mean, median or equivalized measures are used. The difference in LIMEW values 
is less because of the different components that make up the LIMEW such as taxes, transfers, 
household production, public consumption and a different treatment of wealth that is 
incorporated in the LIMEW as opposed to simplistic money income measures.  
 
Both MI and LIMEW include base money income (mainly consisting of earnings) and cash 
transfers. Therefore, these components are not, at a conceptual level, pertinent to explaining why 
the measured disparity between the two groups is much smaller in the LIMEW than in MI. We 
must turn to a closer examination of the other components of wellbeing to understand why the 
gap between the two groups in the LIMEW is small. I will examine the difference in the average 
values of LIMEW for the two groups because, unlike the median, the difference in the average 
values can be disaggregated into differences in the average values of the components (e.g. the 
difference in government transfers can be broken down to differences in its components such as 
Social Security, Medicaid etc.).  
 
I first consider two components that go in favor of the employed. As we pointed out before, base 
money income consists mainly of earnings. But, it can also include some other types of money 
income that are neither government cash transfers nor property income, e.g. alimony. The 
average base money income is not zero for nonemployed households because household 
members other than the head are employed in some households. But, as we would expect, the 
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average base money income of the nonemployed households was much smaller compared to the 
employed. In 2010, it was less than one-fourth while it was slightly higher in the other years 
(Figure 10). The bulk of the base money income accruing to the employed households was from 
the earnings of the head; the latter accounted, on the average, for 77 percent of household base 
money income in 2010.  
 
Figure 10: Base Money Income of Employed and Nonemployed Single Female-Headed 
Households (average values in 2013 dollars) 
 
Source: Author’s calculations  
 
The employed also have a higher average income from wealth (Figure 11). As discussed before, 
income from wealth in LIMEW is measured as the sum of the annuitized value of nonhome 
wealth and imputed rent on owner-occupied homes. In 2010, income from nonhome wealth has 
contributed more than income from home wealth to the gap in income from wealth between the 
employed and nonemployed single female heads (Figure 12).  
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Figure 11: Income from Wealth of Employed and Nonemployed Single Female-Headed 
Households (average values in 2013 dollars) 
 
Source: Author’s calculations  
 
Figure 12: Components of Income from Wealth of Employed and Nonemployed Single 
Female-Headed Households (average values in 2013 dollars) in 2010 
 
Source: Author’s calculations  
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I now turn to components that go in favor of the nonemployed: net government expenditures and 
value of household production. Net government expenditures reflect the difference between 
government expenditures for households and tax payments by households. As shown in Figure 
13, average net government expenditures for the nonemployed are several times higher than that 
for employed households. 
 
Figure 13: Net Government Expenditures of Employed and Nonemployed Single Female-
Headed Households (average values in 2013 dollars) 
 
Source: Author’s calculations  
 
To understand the difference better, I examine the payment side of the ledger first. Here, as one 
would expect, the average amount is much higher for employed households (Figure 14). The 
composition of taxes also differs between the two groups. Income (61 percent) and payroll taxes 
(23 percent) constitute the bulk of the taxes paid by the employed in 2010. In contrast, the 
nonemployed are paying only 25 percent of the taxes paid by the employed single female-headed 
households. Their taxes are comprised of 52 percent income taxes, 18 percent payroll taxes, 14 
percent property taxes and 16 percent consumption taxes.   
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Figure 14: Taxes Paid by Employed and Nonemployed Single Female-Headed Households 
(average values in 2013 dollars)  
 
Source: Author’s calculations  
 
Figure 15: Components of Taxes Paid by Employed and Nonemployed Single Female-
Headed Households (average values in 2013 dollars) in 2010 
 
Source: Author’s calculations  
 
Next, I consider the expenditure side of the ledger, i.e. government expenditures for households. 
We observe that the average amount of transfers received by the nonemployed is considerably 
higher than the employed (Figure 16). Transfers consist of cash and noncash transfers - both of 
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which are higher for nonemployed single female-headed households. The composition of the 
transfers will become clearer when we look at the components of cash and noncash transfers for 
the two groups.  
 
Figure 16: Transfers Received by Employed and Nonemployed Single Female-Headed 
Households (average values in 2013 dollars)  
 
Source: Author’s calculations  
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Figure 17: Components of Government Cash Transfers Received by Employed and 
Nonemployed Single Female-Headed Households (average values in 2013 dollars) in 2010 
 
Source: Author’s calculations  
 
Although some may think that the cash transfers are higher because of the “welfare” received by 
the nonemployed single female heads, this is far from the truth. A disaggregation of cash 
transfers can show us why (Figure 17). Roughly two thirds of the cash transfers received by the 
nonemployed in 2010consisted of unemployment compensation (41 percent of the total) and 
Social Security (25 percent).21  In other words, the major portion of the cash transfers received 
                                                
21 The higher average value of Social Security received by the nonemployed is largely a reflection of the higher 
proportion of individuals aged 62 (the earliest one could be eligible for the program in 2010) and over and widows 
living in their households compared to the proportions of similar individuals in employed households. Individuals 
that were 62 and older made up 30 and 14 percent, respectively, of the people living in nonemployed and employed 
households in 2010. Similarly, widows constituted 10.07 and 7.4 percent, respectively, of all women older than 25 
years living in nonemployed and employed households.  
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by the nonemployed was not means-tested benefits, but entitlements that are available to the 
covered population, irrespective of their income. Public cash assistance or “welfare” was only 
one fourth of the cash transfers received by the nonemployed heads in 2010. The next biggest 
item was Supplemental Social Security (SSI). Limited means is necessary but not sufficient to 
receive this benefit.22 To be eligible, the person should be older than 65, disabled or blind—
attributes that are not in the domain of “choice” of individuals.  In comparison, the make-up of 
cash transfers among the employed households were as follows: the largest component in 2010 
for employed households was Social Security (27 percent) followed by refundable tax credits (26 
percent) and unemployment compensation (23 percent).  
 
Figure 18: Components of Government Noncash Transfers Received by Employed and 
Nonemployed Single Female-Headed Households (average values in 2013 dollars) in 2010 
 
Source: Author’s calculations  
 
                                                
22 See https://www.ssa.gov/ssi/text-eligibility-ussi.htm. (Accessed on 4/21/2017). 
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Next, let us consider noncash transfers. Just as with cash transfers, the average amount received 
by the nonemployed is substantially higher than the employed (Figure 18). 
 
Examining the composition of noncash transfers raises some interesting questions about the 
treatment of health care in the measurement of economic wellbeing since the bulk of noncash 
transfers consist of Medicaid—a means-tested government medical benefits program—for both 
groups (Figure). Medicaid was 55 percent and Medicare was 15 percent of total noncash 
transfers for the employed single female-headed household. The figures were 57 percent and 9 
percent respectively for nonemployed single female-headed households. In the LIMEW, 
government medical benefits are valued at their insurance value. The logic here is that the 
medical expenditures incurred by the government enhance the individual’s command over 
products—in this case access to health care--- and hence an appropriate monetary value should 
be assigned to that benefit. Medicare and Medicaid participants are assigned an insurance value 
for the medical benefits they receive. In the case of Medicaid, there are four risk classes: children 
under 18, nonelderly adults (18 to 64 years old), elderly (65 and older), and blind and disabled. 
The insurance value for each class is differentiated across states. 23 In a similar vein, the 
employer contributions to health insurance premiums are included in the LIMEW of the 
households. 
 
Given the peculiar nature of healthcare provisioning in the U.S. (compared to other developed 
countries) and the relatively large value of medical benefits for nonemployed households, it is 
useful to see how much difference the inclusion of the value of medical benefits makes for the 
measured disparity between the employed and nonemployed households. I conducted the 
sensitivity analysis by excluding the value of employer provided health insurance, Medicare and 
Medicaid from the LIMEW of the single female-headed households. The resulting estimates for 
2010 show that the ratio of the average LIMEW of the employed to nonemployed households is 
110 percent, compared to 104 percent when the value of medical benefits are included. While 
this is a sizeable increase in the measured disparity between the two groups, it is important to 
                                                
23 The insurance values are provided by the Census Bureau and are available in the public-use microdata files. 
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note that the extent in the disparity is still a lot lower than the disparity in average money income 
(283 percent in 2010). 
 
Table 10: Medicare and Medicaid Coverage of Employed and Nonemployed Single Female 
Headed Households  
COVERAGE	  LAST	  YEAR	   EMPLOYED	  %	  	  
NONEMPLOYED	  
%	  
MEDICARE	   1.39	   9.15	  
MEDICAID	   8.97	   44.57	  
Source: Author’s calculations  
 
When we check the Medicare and Medicaid coverage of the two groups in 2010 (Table 10), we 
see that 1.39 percent of employed single female-headed households report having Medicare and 
9.15 percent of nonemployed single female-headed households report having Medicare. 
Medicaid coverage is much higher, as expected, (44.57 percent as opposed to 8.97 percent for 
employed single female heads) for nonemployed single female-headed households.  
 
“Leaver” studies that research women leaving welfare is particularly relevant here. They show 
that single female heads are often employed in low paid jobs with no health care benefits or sick 
days, and have little or no vacation time. They do not stay employed for very long and move in 
and out of employment because of the time limits on welfare grants. (Wendell Primus, Lynette 
Rawlings, Kathy Larin and Kathryn Porter 1999; Gregory Acs and Pamela Loprest 2000). Such 
families have more income from earnings when they are employed as opposed to when they are 
on welfare but they receive less public assistance because they have lost welfare and food stamps 
(and in some cases WIC and Medicaid). Loss of public assistance is supplemented by an increase 
in earnings and tax credits but the average “leaver” family finds itself in roughly the same 
income level as they were when receiving welfare. Theses results have been observed in the best 
economic expansions. Therefore, this is the best that we can expect given the current welfare 
system.  
Continuing with the expenditure side of the ledger in the LIMEW analysis, I now discuss 
disparities in the other major category of government expenditures for households, namely, 
public consumption.  Unlike transfers, the disparity in public consumption between the two 
groups is not too large (Figure 19).  
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Figure 19: Public Consumption of Employed and Nonemployed Single Female-Headed 
Households (average values in 2013 dollars) 
 
Source: Author’s calculations  
 
Figure 20: Components of Public Consumption of Employed and Nonemployed Single 
Female-Headed Households (average values in 2013 dollars) in 201024 
 
Source: Author’s calculations  
                                                
24 pchlthosp= expenditure on public health, pcpolfire=expenditure on fire and police, 
pcedu=expenditure on education, pchwy=expenditure on highway, pcothrs=all other expenditure, 
pubcon=public consumption 
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Upon closer investigation, shown in Figure 20, we see that this is because the largest component 
of public consumption is public education and it contributes mostly for the difference in public 
consumption between the two groups. In 2010, public education for the two groups was around 
55 percent of the total value of public consumption for the employed group and 59 percent for 
the nonemployed group. This is because expenditure on education is mainly determined by 
geographical factors (i.e., the state of residence) and number of school-going children rather than 
their employment status. 
 
Both the employed and nonemployed households are net beneficiaries of the fiscal system 
(Figure 13). The reason why the employed appear to receive a net benefit is because public 
consumption is included in LIMEW. Conventional measures count only government transfers on 
the benefit side of the ledger. If this practice, which has been criticized as inadequate by Wolff 
and Zacharias (2003) as well as the Sarkozy Commission later, were to be followed, the 
employed single female-headed households would appear to be a net payer, on the average, 
while their nonemployed counterparts would appear as a net beneficiary. 
 
I now turn to the value of household production, a component for which the average value is 
higher for the nonemployed than employed households (Figure 21). In the next figure (Figure 
22), we look at the components and the reasons driving this difference.  
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Figure 21: Value of Household Production of Employed and Nonemployed Single Female-
Headed Households (average values in 2013 dollars)  
 
Source: Author’s calculations  
 
 
Figure 22: Household Production Hours and Market Hours of Employed and 
Nonemployed Single Female-Headed Households and Heads in 2010 (average values) 
 
Source: Author’s calculations  
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The difference in the average value of household production between the two groups depends on 
two factors: difference in hours of household production and difference in the implicit unit value 
of household production. 25 To assess the importance of the latter source of difference, I 
compared the average value of household production for the two groups using the same unit 
value (estimated hourly wage of domestic help in 2010). I found that the average value of 
household production for the nonemployed households was 133 percent of that of employed 
household under the “same unit value assumption” compared to 152 percent under the 
“differentiated unit value assumption” of LIMEW.  This shows that the difference in the value of 
household production between the two groups is mainly due to the difference in hours and not 
the difference in the replacement cost. 
 
I found that the average hours of household production was somewhat higher for nonemployed 
households than employed households (Figure 22). This is not surprising because much of the 
difference is driven by the difference in the average hours spent on household production by the 
head. In 2010, for example, out of the 560 hours gap in total hours of household production 
between the two groups of households, the gap between the heads was 346.7 hours or 62 percent.  
 
It is, however, noteworthy that the employed head too is engaged in a substantial amount of 
household production, although the average hours are lower than that of their nonemployed 
counterparts (Figure 22). This reflects the reality of the “second shift” for many working women 
which means that taking on a job does not translate into a major reduction in housework and care 
responsibilities.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
25 This is an implicit value because the value of household production is generated at the individual level but then 
summed to find the value for the household.  
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Table 11: Summary of Major Components of LIMEW for Employed and Nonemployed 
Single Female Heads  
Year 2004   2007   2010   2013   
  Employed Nonemployed  Employed  Nonemployed  Employed  Nonemployed  Employed  Nonemployed  
Base MI  52,948   12,539   55,195   13,888   53,471   12,613   53,199   16,952  
Employer's 
contribution 
to health 
 3,477   498   3,292   530   3,341   524   3,207   581  
Income 
from wealth  8,892   3,132   11,090   4,101   9,724   5,269   10,867   3,408  
Net 
government 
expenditures 
 4,938   39,556   4,073   38,787   7,463   44,144   5,857   43,025  
Transfers  6,513   20,603   7,560   20,518   9,236   26,087   8,835   25,387  
Public 
consumption  12,468   22,329   13,653   22,930   14,284   22,063   13,608   22,140  
Taxes -14,043  -3,375  -17,140  -4,661  -16,057  -4,006  -16,586  -4,503  
Household 
production  15,437   29,325   14,657   27,550   15,447   23,488   15,120   26,377  
LIMEW  85,691   85,050   88,306   84,855   89,445   86,038   88,249   90,342  
Source: Author’s calculations  
 
I provide summary information regarding the major components of LIMEW discussed above in 
Table 11 for the most recent four years for which the LIMEW was estimated. In sum, the gap in 
average LIMEW between the employed and nonemployed single female-headed households is 
the outcome of two opposing forces. The higher amounts of base income and income from 
wealth that the employed receive are offset to a large extent by the higher amounts of net 
government expenditures received by and value of household production accruing to the 
nonemployed (Figure 23). Differences in income from wealth and household production are 
small relative to the differences in base income and net government expenditures. While it is true 
that some members of the nonemployed households are employed, the fact that the head, 
generally the person with the most earnings potential in the household, is not employed results in 
a much lower average base income than the employed households. On the other hand, while 
average public consumption tends to be roughly similar for the two groups, transfers are skewed 
heavily in favor of the nonemployed and taxes are much larger for the employed, leading to 
substantially higher net government expenditures for the nonemployed.  
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Figure 23: Difference in Components of LIMEW between Employed and Nonemployed 
Single Female Heads 
 
Source: Author’s calculations  
 
Next, we do an Oaxaca Blinder decomposition to understand the gap in economic wellbeing of 
the two groups. The Oaxaca decomposition method decomposes the overall wellbeing gap 
between the employed and nonemployed single female-headed households into two components: 
one explained by observable differences between the employed and the non-employed and the 
other, residual, due to the differences in the rates of return due to those characteristics. The 
residual portion of the wellbeing gap is unexplained. The basic idea of this decomposition 
procedure is that differences in wellbeing between two groups can be partially explained by the 
fact that these groups have different attributes, whereas the remaining portion of the gap is 
unexplained.  
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Estimation	  Method	   𝐿: = 	  𝛼: +	  𝛽: +	  𝜀: 	  
	  	  	  	  	  
	   𝐿= = 	  𝛼= +	  𝛽= +	  𝜀= 	  
	  	  
 
Where, 𝐿 is the LIMEW (log of LIMEW), α is the intercept, β are the coefficients of the 
different characteristics, ε is the error term, subscript e is for the employed single female heads 
and n is for the nonemployed single female heads.  
 𝐿: −	  𝐿= = 𝐿: −	  𝐿=	   `	   + 𝐿: −	  𝐿=	   	   
 - 
 
 
Where the total difference is the difference due to characteristics 𝐿: −	  𝐿=	   `  and the 
unexplained difference	   𝐿: −	  𝐿=	   .  
 
The same sample used for the Heckman Selection Model and the LIMEW analysis is used for 
this LIMEW decomposition.  
 
The variable used for the decomposition are - education, race, age, age squared, dummy 
variables for the geographical division, metropolitan dummy, number of kids, the presence of 
children under the age of 6, and number of people in the household. 
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Results	  	  
 
Table 12: Decomposition of the Gap in LIMEW between Employed and Nonemployed 
Single Female-Headed Households 
loglimew Coefficients Std. Err  z P>z      [95% Conf. Interval] 
       
overall       
       
Nonemployed 
SFH 11.084 0.026 433.760 0.000 11.034 11.134 
Employed 
SFH 11.171 0.007 1689.670 0.000 11.158 11.184 
difference -0.087 0.026 -3.300 0.001 -0.139 -0.035 
explained 0.079 0.018 4.400 0.000 0.044 0.114 
unexplained -0.166 0.021 -8.070 0.000 -0.207 -0.126 
       
explained        
       
number of 
kids  -0.061 0.007 -8.670 0.000 -0.074 -0.047 
dummy for 
young kids  -0.020 0.003 -5.820 0.000 -0.026 -0.013 
number of 
people in the 
household 
minus the 
head 0.286 0.023 12.410 0.000 0.241 0.332 
less than high 
school  -0.077 0.007 -10.310 0.000 -0.091 -0.062 
high school  -0.044 0.006 -6.890 0.000 -0.056 -0.031 
some college  0.012 0.004 2.850 0.004 0.004 0.020 
age -0.033 0.010 -3.150 0.002 -0.053 -0.012 
age squared  0.030 0.009 3.130 0.002 0.011 0.048 
nonwhite  -0.015 0.002 -6.090 0.000 -0.020 -0.010 
new england  0.000 0.001 -0.480 0.632 -0.001 0.001 
mid atlantic  0.000 0.001 0.440 0.657 -0.001 0.002 
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east north 
central  0.000 0.001 -0.860 0.390 -0.002 0.001 
west north 
central  0.001 0.001 1.950 0.051 0.000 0.003 
south atlantic 0.001 0.001 1.040 0.300 -0.001 0.002 
east south 
central -0.001 0.001 -0.880 0.378 -0.002 0.001 
pacific 
division 0.000 0.001 -0.080 0.935 -0.001 0.001 
not in 
metropolitan -0.001 0.001 -1.590 0.112 -0.003 0.000 
       
unexplained       
       
number of 
kids  0.052 0.034 1.550 0.121 -0.014 0.118 
dummy for 
young kids  0.017 0.017 0.990 0.321 -0.016 0.050 
number of 
people in the 
household 
minus the 
head -0.064 0.040 -1.600 0.110 -0.143 0.015 
less than high 
school  0.011 0.015 0.760 0.449 -0.018 0.041 
high school  0.045 0.022 2.020 0.043 0.001 0.089 
some college  0.039 0.019 2.010 0.045 0.001 0.077 
age -0.052 0.674 -0.080 0.939 -1.372 1.269 
age squared  -0.045 0.344 -0.130 0.897 -0.719 0.630 
nonwhite  0.075 0.019 3.980 0.000 0.038 0.112 
new england  0.006 0.005 1.270 0.204 -0.003 0.016 
mid atlantic  0.039 0.011 3.590 0.000 0.018 0.061 
east north 
central  0.037 0.012 3.010 0.003 0.013 0.061 
west north 
central  0.011 0.005 2.260 0.024 0.001 0.021 
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south atlantic 0.037 0.015 2.410 0.016 0.007 0.067 
east south 
central 0.005 0.007 0.730 0.463 -0.008 0.018 
pacific 
division 0.020 0.010 2.010 0.044 0.001 0.040 
not in 
metropolitan 0.015 0.009 1.650 0.100 -0.003 0.032 
constant  -0.415 0.343 -1.210 0.226 -1.088 0.257 
Source: Author’s calculations  
 
From the decomposition results, we again see that the employed single female-headed 
households have a higher LIMEW than the nonemployed single female-headed households. Out 
of the difference, 0.079 is explained by the difference in the characteristics of the two groups and  
-0.166 is unexplained. The explained differences go in favor of the employed single female 
heads while the unexplained differences, somewhat puzzlingly, go in favor of the nonemployed. 
However, this is not an important issue in our context because the decomposition serves only as 
a descriptive tool and not as a tool for identifying causal effects.    
 
From the characteristics we see that even if the nonemployed single female heads had the same 
characteristics as the employed single female heads, their LIMEW would still be negatively 
affected by the number of kids in their household and the presence of young children in the 
household. The education variables show that a less than high school education would negatively 
affect the LIMEW of nonemployed single female heads. High school education would also have 
a negative impact but it would be more beneficial for the nonemployed heads to have a high 
school degree than have less than high school education. On the other hand, some college 
education would have a positive effect on the LIMEW of nonemployed single female heads. Age 
seems to have a negative effect on their economic wellbeing and so does being nonwhite. The 
regional variables mostly do not yield significant results and the same goes for the variable that 
shows whether the household is in a metropolitan area. The results are in alignment to what we 
have observed before and reinstate the burden of care responsibilities from children on the 
nonemployed single female heads.  
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CONCLUSION	  
 
In this study I attempted to study the economic wellbeing of singe female-headed households and 
how employment impacts the economic wellbeing of such households. Policy reform has pushed 
for employment over welfare for single female heads and this study explored how employment 
changes their LIMEW (Levy Institute Measure of Economic Wellbeing). The LIMEW is used in 
this paper because it takes account of household production and noncash transfers which is 
particularly relevant for single female-headed households.  
 
From the study we can see that not all nonemployed single female heads can become employed: 
there are those who are sick, disabled and some have significant care responsibilities. We 
observe the significance of care responsibilities in terms of caring for children from both our 
Heckman selection model and our decomposition analysis. This shows that a one-size-fits-all 
employment program may not be successful when trying to ameliorate the economic status of 
single female-headed households. Net government expenditures are positive for both groups; but, 
much more so for the nonemployed. This is mainly because of Social Security, unemployment 
insurance and medical benefits (Medicaid). Cutting back on these programs will not necessarily 
prompt nonemployable single female heads to become employed because there are other 
impediments such as those mentioned above that are preventing them from being employed. The 
first two programs are non-means tested cash transfers that are broadly supported by the 
population and politicians. They are unlikely to be reformed in a fashion to exclude single female 
heads. 
 
When it comes to Medicaid, numerous studies show the benefits of Medicaid and how it has 
been successful in reducing infant mortality rates in the United States (Moss and Carver 1998). 
This is particularly true for low income groups in the country (Currie and Gruber 1996). Cutting 
back on medical benefits is unlikely to push them towards employment. Rather, it will only 
expose them and their families to health risks and this might make them more prone to a shorter 
life expectancy. It is unlikely to make them become employed since being ill or disabled is often 
a barrier to getting hired and keeping a job in the first place. Further, the kind of jobs that they 
can get is likely to have little or no medical benefits (health insurance). As our wage equation 
estimates showed, the employable may be willing to work at a lower wage than the currently 
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employed - but there does not seem to be enough jobs or jobs that they can hold while fulfilling 
their household responsibilities. 
 
The jobs that would benefit this group of women would have to come with government financed 
child care (Bergman and Hartmann 1995), child allowances and universal health care. Other 
ancillary benefits such as family paid leave would address the problem of discontinuous 
employment caused by child birth. Policies aimed at single female heads must account for such 
support mechanisms in conjunction with employment if they are to improve the economic 
wellbeing of this group. 
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